something increasingly driven since the end of the cold war by america's unique capability to project the enormous amounts of conventional military force into the middle east. no one else, not even chided can project this kind of military force into the middle east today or four years to come. this has given the united states extraordinary economic and political influence in the middle east and we forced the military dominance in other key parts of the world. but our failures in afghanistan and iraq in particular have underscored and especially for the middle east republics, the limits of what american military might can accomplish. we argue these failures of the middle east policy are not just idiosyncratic generated products of the george to be bush said ministration but as we described in our book fees stemming from a much deeper source that cut through both democratic and republican did frustration than something we describe as the united states each essentially giving in to the post cold war temptation to act as an imperial power in the middle east and this turned in policy with